In this paper, we study a buyback contract model of the competitive newsvendor problem between a single supplier and multiple retailers under simultaneous price and safety stock competition. A price completion factor and a spill rate translate the price and safety stock competition, respectively. Our model is an extension of the problem analyzed in Zhao and Atkins (2) by the adoption of a buyback rate in the chain, which gives new Nash equilibrium conditions. Then, we compute numerically the Nash equilibrium prices, optimal wholesale prices for the supplier's and the retailers' profits and supply chain optimal retailers' prices. The effect of competition and distribution parameters will be discussed and compared to that of the non-competitive model and chain optimization.
Introduction
The majority of problems in supply chain management can be translated into mathematical models, which are solved based on the setting of chain parameters. As a simple model, we find the newsvendor problem, in which a single supplier sells his products to a single retailer. This elementary problem was studied intensively in several publications such as in Cachon et al., Zhao et al., and Oğuz el al.
(1)∼ (3) . Although, the differences between these studies are the decision criteria and the nature of demand function, the objective is relatively the same. In first stage, the supplier and the retailer must take actions to optimize their profits. In second stage, their objective is to optimize the total supply chain. Finally, the problem is entirely solved. The actions can be taken with coordination and/or by setting a contract between the supplier and the retailer as reported by Xiaolong et al. and Fugate et al. (4) (5) . However, there are not only one retailer and one supplier in the market. This reality leads to the study of newsvendor problems in multi-retailers and/or multi-suppliers supply chains as in Caio et al. (6) . In another term, a competition between the different actors of the chain cannot be avoided. For example, the retailers compete in the market to attract the maximum number of consumers. This competition was extremely studied in several types of contracts, such as the contract models between multiple retailers with stochastic demand and under various decision variables. In
Bernstein and Federgruen (7) , they have studied a competition between multiple retailers in the case of price dependent demand, where retailers compete on retail prices. In Zhao and Atkins (2) , the authors have developed, through a contraction mapping approach, the sufficient conditions of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in simultaneous price and inventory dependent demand function.
In this paper, we study a model of competitive newsvendor problem between a single supplier and multiple retailers under simultaneous price and safety stock competition. A price competition factor and a spill rate translate the price and safety stock competition, respectively. Our model is an extension of the problem analyzed in Ref. (2) by the adoption of a buyback rate in the chain, which gives new Nash equilibrium conditions. This last option is a good example of appropriate contracts, which redistributes the risk of overstocking. Buyback contract models were reported in many publications, such as in Ref. (7) . However, the models in our paper and in Ref. (7) are completely different. The decision variables are not same. Second, Bernstein and Federgruen studied the competition under only price competition. However, in our model, safety-stock is added. This difference gives new conditions for existence of Nash solution and different results for optimal decision variables and expected profits. In this model, we compute Nash equilibrium prices, safety stocks, optimal wholesale, optimal supplier and retailers' profits, numerically. In addition, we discuss the effect of chain and distribution parameters on optimal decision variables and expected profits. This paper is organized as fellows: in the next section, we present our contract model and we discuss the sufficient conditions on the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash solution. In §3 we investigate the model with exponential distribution function and with linear demand function. In §4, we present the supply chain optimization and its solution. In §5, we present numerical results and discuss the behavior of Nash equilibrium solution with the competition and distribution parameters. The results will be compared to that of non-competitive case and chain optimization.
Competing Retailers Model
The model of competing retailers for one supplier and retailers is shown in Fig. 1 . The supplier incurs retailer a wholesale price for each product. The supplier produces products at a constant production cost rate including transportation cost to . We assume that the supplier has ample capacity to satisfy any retailer demand. A buyback rate ∞ ∞ for unsold items is used in the supply chain. As mentioned in the introduction, this model studies multiple retailers' competition in a decentralized supply chain, where the demand depends simultaneously on price and safetystock. The safety stock competition factor is given by the spill rate , defined in the stochastic part of the demand. The price competition factor is given in the deterministic part of the demand. In this paper, we use a linear form of demand with symmetric price competition factor . It is expressed with ∑ for 1 , with 0 and 0 . This form of demand is largely used in supply chain management literature. It goes back to Shubik and Levitan (1971) (8) . Then, it is used in many models such as: in Dixit (9) , Banker et al. (10) , Tsay and Agrawal (11) , and Boyaci and Ray (12) . In practice, Shubik and Levitan (8) reported that this linear form of price competition is used in automobile market in the United States. The profit function of is expressed as , , . Using , 0 , , it can be rewritten as:
where denotes the deterministic part of the profit function. This model is studied under the assumption that , , 0 , where and are chosen arbitrarily large. The supplier profit function is given by 
Nash Equilibrium Conditions
In this model, the supplier is a Stackelberg leader who decides the wholesale price for each retailer. The retailers compete each other on retail prices and safety stocks to maximize their own profits. To derive the conditions of existence and uniqueness of Nash solution, we apply "Theorem 1" of Ref. (2) where the difference between our model and that of this reference is the adoption of buyback cost in the chain. In Ref. 
, 0.
By introducing buyback cost in the chain, only Eq. (3) is changed and becomes , 0.
About the uniqueness of the Nash solution, Zhao and Atkins decomposed the demand on three components: deterministic, demand depends only on retail price, and demand depends only on safety stock. From the conditions of uniqueness of Nash solution in each part, they developed strong conditions of uniqueness for the entire problem, as given by
The first condition is valid for our model because it is independent of buy-back cost. However, the second condition is changed by introducing buy-back parameter and given by
With the demand function described above, the deterministic part of profit function is expressed as To satisfy the condition (B), the of must have an . This property is satisfied only by some kind of such as exponential and uniform distributions. In this paper, we restrain our study to exponential distribution because it facilities theoretical analysis more than in case of uniform one. In addition, our essential objective is studying the effect of chain parameters on decision variables and expected profits, which is insensitive to the distribution function of stochastic variables. Then, for 1 , the and of are expressed for all 0 by 1 and , respectively. Now, we have to explicit the and of effective stochastic component of demand function
. At this step, we face a technical problem when the number of retailers exceeds two because the number of stochastic variables will be equal or greater than two. Then, we restrain our theoretical and numerical analysis to the case of two retailers. We start by evaluating the of using the equation:
The right hand side can be written as 
Then, the retail prices can be expressed from Eq. (5). For 1, 2 we have :
Equation (5) shows the relationship between retail prices and safety stocks in case of Nash equilibrium. From that, the decision variables can be simplified to only safety stock variables.
To explicit the solution of the problem we have to evaluate the Eq. (2). The second term of Eq.
(2) can be expressed as , , , , with , . Then, we obtain
The left hand side of Eq. (2) depends on demand function. The Eqs. (2) and (3) can be rewritten in a non-linear system of equations , 0 and , 0, with:
The Newton method is used to solve this non-linear system of equation, simultaneously. We set the initial value , and we make an iterative computation , to solve , 0 and , 0, according to the following solution:
The computation starts to search the wholesale price which maximizes the supplier profit function by incrementing its value from 1. After that, the Nash safety stocks solution is obtained using the Newton method as described before. The Nash retail prices will be calculated according to Eq. (4). Finally, the retailers' profit functions are given by , , ,
, .
Three parameters in the model have a particular importance. These parameters are the spill rate, the price competition factor, and the distribution parameter. It is important to note that in the case of zero spill rates, the competition is restrained to retail prices. In the case of zero price competition factors, we obtain safety stock competition model. However, if the two parameters are equal to zero, we obtain a non-competitive model with only price sensitive demand. Thus, it will be important to compare our results to that non-competitive case. Furthermore, the effect of the model parameters on the wholesale price, the safety stock, the retail prices, the total inventory, the retailer's profit functions, the supplier profit function, and the total profit function will be compared with the solution of supply chain optimization, studied in next section.
Supply Chain Optimization
Supply chain optimization is the setting of processes and tools to ensure the optimal operation of manufacturing and distribution in a supply chain. For example, this can be translated to the setting of the optimal prices and safety stocks to maximize the total profit of the chain. For example, in our case, to search the optimal solution, we consider the total profit function for two retailers and one supplier as given by
The optimal solution can be obtained by differentiating Eq. (6) on the four independent variables (retail prices and safety stocks) and set the system to zero. Then, we obtain , 2
The system of Eq. (7) is independent of wholesale prices and buyback rates. It is a nonlinear system. Thus, Newton method is used to solve it. The solution will be compared with that of Nash equilibrium in the next section.
Numerical Results
Our computation is restrained to symmetric parameters and we define for , 1, 2, the spill rate , the distribution parameter . The numerical values of chain and distribution parameters, used for simulation are: 300, 1, 0.5, 0.2, 1, 45, and 60. The program is coded by C and the computations are done using Fujitsu C compiler on PC. As explained in section 3, the strategy of the simulations is based on the maximization of the supplier profit function to set the wholesale price. In Tables 1, 2 , and 3, we present the numerical results for different values of the spill rate γ, the price competition factor θ, and the distribution parameter λ. We report the optimal supplier profit function, the two retailer's profit functions, the entire profit function, the wholesale prices which maximize the supplier profit function, the two retail prices, the two retail safety stocks, and the two retail total demand functions. As a first result, we find that the optimal wholesale prices to maximize the supplier profit function are not affected by the various of γ, λ, and θ. The prices and the safety stocks for the two retailers are the same due to the symmetric value of the chain parameters.
Behavior of the Nash solution with the chain parameters

Non-completive model
The case of non-competitive model is obtained by setting the spill rate and the price competition factor to zero. The results are given in the second column of table 1. This elementary newsvendor problem was studied by Petruzzi and Dada (13) . The retail prices, the safety stocks, the profit function of retailers are higher than that found in case of competition. However, the supplier profit function, the total profit function in case of Nash, and the total inventories of the retailers are less than in the case of competition.
Effect of the spill rate
First, in absence of safety stock competition ( = 0), the effective stochastic component of the demand is restrained to ε i and the model is only under price competition and price sensitive-demand. In this case, we find our results published in Ref. (14) . In addition, the retail prices are high and the total inventory is low. Increasing the spill rate increases the stochastic part of the demand function and consequently increases the total demand function. As a consequence, the retail prices and the retailers' profit functions decrease. However, the supplier profit function increases but it cannot compensate the decrease of the retailers' profit functions, thus the total profit function decreases.
Effect of price competition factor
As in last paragraph, we discuss the model in absence of price competition ( 0). In this case, the results are near that of the case of non-competitive model except the safety stock. This is explained by the low value of the spill rate (= 0.2) which depends directly the safety stock. In addition, increasing the price competition factor affects the Nash solution due its existence in the left hand side of Eq. (2). In Proposition 2 of Ref. (2) , it was proved that in the case of linear demand function, the total demand increases with in contrast to the safety stocks. Our results are in accordance with this proposition. Thus, as the intensity of price competition increases, the increase of the deterministic part of the total demand function exceeds the decrease of the safety stocks. Therefore, the retailers increase their total demand and keep lower their safety stocks, which results in decrease of their selling prices. In addition, the supplier's profit increases and compensates the dropping of retailers' profits, which results in increase of total profit function.
Effect of the distribution parameter
The distribution parameter λ characterizes the distribution function rate in the stochastic part of the demand function. Increasing λ has a weak impact on retail prices, supplier profit function, total demand function, and total profit; however drops the safety stock. 
Comparison between the Nash solution and the optimal one
The results of the optimal solution, analyzed in section 4, are given in Tables 4, 5 , and 6. In the case of supply chain optimization, the retail prices are not affected considerably by the increase of γ in contrast to the safety stocks which increase with it. This can be explained by the correlation between the spill rate γ and the stochastic part of the demand function. The ratio (EEP-Nash)/(EEP-optimal) is nearly constant because the impact of retail prices on the total profit function is higher than the impact of the safety stocks and in the two cases of Nash solution and optimal one. The factor does not affect the optimal solution due to the symmetric values of the retail prices. However, the comparison between the Nash solution and the optimal one shows a large difference on the retail prices and the safety stocks. The retails prices in the optimal solution are lower than in the case of Nash solution in contrast to the safety stocks. This result affects considerably the total demand functions which are high in the case of optimal solution due essentially to the effect of the retail prices. The ratio (EEP-Nash)/(EEP-optimal) increases with increase of the competition factor θ . This can be explained by the effect of the strong price competition which leads retailers to reduce their safety stocks and increase their profits. The impact of the distribution rate λ on the safety stocks is considerable in contrast to the retail prices which are nearly constant. This can be explained by the same effect of the spill rate , however in this case the safety stocks decrease dramatically. The ratio (EEP-Nash)/(EEP-optimal) is nearly constant because the impact of retail prices on the total profit function is higher than the impact of the safety stocks and in the two cases of Nash solution and optimal one the retail prices are not considerably affected by the various of . 
Conclusion
In this paper, the condition of Nash equilibrium solution are presented for a buyback contract model for one supplier and multiple retailers, where the demand is stochastic and depends on price and safety stock. The performances of the Nash solution are discussed numerically for various price and safety stock competition factors. They are also compared with that of the optimization solution and the case of non-competitive model. The Nash solution is computed based on the maximization of the supplier profit function and the use of the Newton method to solve the non-linear equations. This solution is found to depend strongly on the price competition factor, the spill rate, and the distribution parameter. In addition, the ratio of entire profit function of the Nash solution and the optimal one is found to increase with price completion factor; however, it is nearly constant when the spill rate and the distribution parameters are varied. This problem can be extended by introducing new decision parameters such as the lead-time.
